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Abstract
This paper develops a model of pricing and advertising in a matching environment with capacity
constrained sellers and uncoordinated buyers. Sellers’ search intensity attracts buyers only proba-
bilistically through costly informative advertisement. Equilibrium prices and profit maximizing ad-
vertising levels are derived and their properties analyzed. The model generates an inverted U-shape
relationship between individual advertisement and market tightness which is robust to alternative
advertising technologies. The well known empirical fact in the IO literature reflects the trade-off be-
tween price and market tightness-matching effects. Finally, in this environment we can alleviate the
discontinuity problem, allowing for unique symmetric equilibrium price to be derived.
JEL Classification: L11, L13, M37.
Keywords: Directed searching, Advertising, Pricing, Market structure
1 Introduction
Recent research has focused on models where trade is neither Walrasian nor random matching. In a
Walrasian world, communication between buyers and sellers is costless. In contrast, random matching
models have very large costs mainly due to a pairwise matching restriction. Less severe informational
restrictions are considered in models with directed search. In these environments, sellers face capacity
constraints and buyers are uncoordinated when selecting a particular seller, but sellers communicate
with buyers to influence their choice of trading partner. Thus, a seller might be selected by more than
one buyer, in which case they may face rationing. Central to this literature is the information flow from
sellers to buyers.1
∗We would like to thank Carlos Pimienta, Bill Schworm and seminar participants at the workshops at UNSW and University
of Essex for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Email: pedro.gomis@anu.edu.au
‡Email: benoit.julien@unsw.edu.au
§Email: chengsi.wang@unsw.edu.au
1See Peters(1991), Burdett, Shi and Wright(2001) and Julien, Kennes, and King (2000,2005), among others, for more on this
literature.
1
The idea of introducing informative advertisements sent by sellers has a long tradition in economics.
In his seminal work, Butters(1977) considers an exogenous market structure with many buyers and sell-
ers who set the price for a homogeneous good. These buyers are transient, buy one unit each in a single
purchase and the only possible information flow between sellers and buyers is through costly adver-
tising. More recently, Stegemen (1991 extends Butters (1977) by considering heterogeneous reservation
values for buyers. Stahl (1994), on the other hand, considers finite number of buyers and sellers, allowing
also for downward sloping individual demand curves while considering a general advertising technol-
ogy. All these models exhibit the standard non-existence of pure price equilibrium strategies. This is
the case because sellers’ payoffs are discontinuous when prices are equal. A common assumption in
these models is that their environments do not consider sellers with capacity constraints, thus reducing
the value of the signal. Moreover, these papers do not deliver a non linear relationship between market
structure and advertising.
A substantial body of empirical work has been devoted to study the regularities between the infor-
mation sent by sellers, as measured by advertising, and market tightness, the ratio of buyers to sellers.
Schmalensee (1989) reports that among consumer goods industries, advertising intensity increases with
concentration at low levels of concentration; the relation may vanish or change sign at high levels of con-
centration. For instance, Buxton, Davies and Lyon(1984) find an inverted U-shape pattern between mar-
ket structure and advertising in the U.S. manufacturing for the period 1963 to 1977 industries. Similarly,
Uri(1987) using data for 1977 for the United States for 301 four-digit SIC industries and advertising-sales
data from Business Survey (1978) show a similar non-linear pattern. For the Korean manufacturing in-
dustries, Lee (2002) also finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between concentration and advertising
intensity.2
The equilibrium existence problems found in the literature and the empirical regularities between
advertisement and market structure motivate our work. The objective of this paper is to provide a for-
mal framework that explores how the incentives of sending probabilistic signals from sellers to buyers
changes as different market structures are considered. In particular, we characterize the equilibrium
relationships between advertising, pricing and market tightness in an environment with coordination
frictions, capacity constraints and probabilistic signals. The paper closest in spirit to our work is that of
Lester(2010) where he allows an exogenous number of informed and uninformed buyers to trade when
2For an excellent survey of the advertising literature, we refer to Bagwell(2007).
2
signals are costless and there is no role for advertising. He finds that having more informed buyers can
lead to a decrease in prices, have no effect at all, or even lead to an increase in prices in finite markets.
In our framework sellers have access to an advertisement technology. This technology allows buyers
to know that sellers exist. Each add, which we refer to as a signal, contains seller’s location, capacity
and price information. These costly signals sent by sellers are only observed probabilistically by buyers.3
Without the advertising technology and buyer search, sellers would not be able to sell and the market
would not exist as emphasized by Butters(1977). In other words, when sellers send signals only a fraction
of buyers observe all prices with a certain probability. Thus returns on advertising are probabilistic.
In this paper we find that higher prices make costly advertising more worthwhile for sellers. The
magnitude of this benefit critically depends on the market structure and the type of advertising tech-
nology. Environments with substantially fewer sellers than buyers (concentrated markets) have a larger
price effect on advertising than markets with substantially more sellers than buyers (competitive mar-
kets). Moreover, the probability with which a seller is visited by one buyer is lower whenever there are lots
of them. Since numerous sellers imply a very low probability that a buyer will select a particular seller,
this reduces the returns to advertising. On the other hand, when there are too few sellers, the probability
with which a buyer will select a particular seller is higher, so that each seller is more likely to be visited by
several buyers. Hence, no need to advertise much. Thus we are able to show that the profit maximizing
advertisement level is inverted U-shape in market tightness, and reaches an interior maximum whenever
there is a sufficiently small marginal cost of advertisement. Otherwise, for large marginal costs, there is
no advertisement. This finding is robust to alternative advertising technologies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the buy-
ers and sellers’ choices while considering Butters(1977) advertising technology and characterizes the
relationship between advertising and market structure. Section 3 considers a more general advertising
technology and characterizes its implications for equilibrium advertising levels. Finally, Section 4 con-
cludes.
3This paper then proposes a model of directly informative advertising.
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2 Butters’ Advertising Technology
In this paper we examine market outcomes when firms produce a product, such as an agricultural com-
modity, which is sufficiently homogenous that advertising expenditures by one firm enhances the de-
mand facing all firms.4 On the supply side there is a well-established tradition in economics of treating
advertising as a quantity of homogeneous messages, which can be purchased by the firm in a competi-
tive market at marginal cost. The assumption that the advertising industry is competitive is reasonable
in so far as there are many advertising agencies competing for clients.
The market considered here consists of a large number of M identical sellers each carrying only one
unit to sell and a large number of N identical potential buyers with unitary demand. We further assume
that the number of buyers and sellers are common knowledge.
In this environment direct communication between buyers and sellers does not exist. Each seller
i must advertise in order to be known in the market. Sellers send signals, denoted by a i , that provide
the seller’s location, capacity and price information. Each buyer observes all the sellers’ signals with a
certain probability γ. 5
Each buyer can only purchase from a particular seller if and only if she has observed the signal from
that seller. This assumption is consistent with the costly search for uninformed buyers and the purchase
of durable goods. To simplify exposition we further assume that the product characteristics are common
knowledge; thus focusing on search goods and directly informative advertising. The sequence of events
in our environment are as follows:
1. Each seller i decides to advertise or not. If so, each seller i chooses simultaneously advertising
a i ∈ R+ and a price p i ∈ [0, 1] to maximize expected profits taking as given the choices of other
sellers.
2. Buyers observe the entire vector of prices p= {p1, p2, · · · · · · , pN }with probability γ.
3. Upon observing all prices, each buyer selects one and only one particular seller with which to
trade.
4The potential free-rider problem that arises in such commodity markets has led to the creation of a large number of
government-sponsored generic advertising campaigns financed by compulsory contributions from industry members. For
example, in the U.S. we observed these two campaigns: "Beef: what is for dinner?" and "Got milk". See Norman, Pepall and
Richards (2008).
5Tremblay and Tremblay(1995) find that the firm’s own advertising has a positive and significant effect on its output price.
In addition, rivals’ advertising has a significant positive though relatively small effect on another firm’s price.
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4. Matches are formed, trade occurs at the advertised prices, and payoffs unfold.
This sequence of events defines a game between buyers and sellers. Throughout the rest of the paper,
we focus on symmetric equilibria so that all sellers choose the same price and advertisement, and buyers
select over sellers using mixed strategies in equilibrium.
From the buyer’s perspective, in order to select seller i with positive probability, the buyer must as-
sess the probability that the other buyers select seller i . This particular structure implies a conflicted
interest between sellers and buyers. Buyers attempt to minimize competition for any given seller, but
sellers try to maximize it. In other words, buyers select over sellers trading off a price and a probability
of trade as in all standard directed search environments.
2.1 Advertising, Pricing and Payoffs
A strategy for a seller i is a combination of prices and signals (p i , a i ) ∈R2+. Each seller, then, chooses its
price and signal simultaneously to maximize expected profits, taking as given other sellers’ choices, and
expected buyers’ behavior.6
In order to be active on the market each seller must send a signal a i , and incur a fixed cost F ∈
[0, 1], which we interpret as the cost of setting up a location.7 Each seller then faces a variable cost of
advertising denoted by c (a i ) with constant marginal cost; i.e., c ′(a i ) > 0 and c ′′(a i ) = 0. The marginal
cost of advertising c (a i ) =βa i , where β is a positive constant.
In the spirit of Butters (1977), we consider a probabilistic advertising technology where with prob-
ability γ(A) = 1− e− AN all buyers observe all prices, where A = ∑Mi=1 a i .8 We note that Butters adver-
tising aims at getting more consumers informed of all locations and prices. Thus it does not have the
business-stealing effect whereby an increase in firm’s advertising will decrease consumers’ awareness of
their competitors products. Moreover, Butters’ technology does not consider the effect of competing for
attention or crowding-out effect. We quote Anderson (2005):
"Advertising Attributes may enhance consumer valuation of characteristics. However, when a firm
advertises a characteristic of its product, this also raises the perceived quality of other rival products that
have the characteristic. There are thus positive externality in advertising (a "Raise-all-boats" effect)..."
6For alternative timings we refer to McAfee(1994) who considers a two-stage model where firms choose advertising first and
prices in the second stage and Robert and Stahl(1993) who consider simultaneous choices.
7Advertisements are costly to set up, or more generally a marketing campaign needs preparation.
8Note that γ(A) is increasing in M and decreasing in N .
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Although products are homogeneous, one can interpret our environment in which advertising is
about prices only instead of characteristics. Hence, when one seller advertises its price, this also raises
the existence of other rival prices and locations, as well as the more traditional competition effect that
comes from advertising a different price.
The expected profit for seller i can be summarized as follows:
Πi
 
p, a; M , N

= γ(A) p i qi (p)− c (a i )− F, (1)
where γ(A)qi (p) represents the probability of sale (the probability to be selected by at least one buyer)
and p is the relevant price vector for the entire economy.9
The strategy for a buyer is a selection over sellers from which they have observed prices. Assuming
that each buyer extracts utility from consuming the good, which we normalize to 1, the buyer surplus
from selecting seller i is (1−p i ). Since each seller has only one unit of the good, the rationing rule is such
that when several buyers select the same seller, each one gets the good with equal probability. Buyers’
selection strategies and this rationing rule translate into a probability Λji for buyer j to be served by
seller i . Notice that this probability depends on the number of other buyers also selecting seller i . The
probability of facing other buyers at seller i only depends on the vector of prices, p, since buyer j knows
all other buyers are informed when herself is informed. Hence, buyer j ’s expected utility from selecting
seller i is given by:
U
j
i (p) = (1−p i ) Λji (p). (2)
To derive the probabilities Λji (p) and qi (p), we need to evaluate the probability that any other partic-
ular buyer k selects firm i , which we denote by θ ki (p). The general characterization of θ
k
i (p) represents
the mixed strategies of buyers. Buyers and sellers use this probability to evaluate the payoffs associated
with their strategies. In particular, a buyer evaluates the probability that other buyers select seller i , and
hence, the probability of being served. A seller, on the other hand, tries to determine the probability of
sale; that is, the probability to be selected by at least one buyer. Finally, since we focus on symmetric
equilibrium with all sellers setting the same price and signals while buyers select over sellers with iden-
tical probabilities. Under these assumptions, for any arbitrary vector of prices and signals set by sellers,
9Although we could introduce costly buyers search by allowing them to sample more communication media or simply
searching for prices as in Robert and Stahl(1993), we focus on search intensity on the sellers’ side. Also, all results derived
in this paper are robust to introduction of outside option for buyers and sellers which would occur with probability (1−γ(A)).
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we have θ
j
i (p) = θi (p), ∀j . Taking other buyers’ selection strategy as given, a typical buyer maximizes her
expected payoff. Thus we must have that:
θi (p)> 0 (3)
⇒Ui (p) =max
k
Uk (P). (4)
The first order conditions yields the mixed-strategy equilibrium selection for a buyer, so that she is
indifferent between selecting any two observed sellers. In other words, θi (p) satisfies:
U
j
i (p) =U
j
` (p) ∀i ,`∈M . (5)
If a particular buyer is informed, her probability of getting served by seller i , Λi , must satisfy the
following local market clearing condition:
Nθi (p)Λi (p) = 1−  1−θi (p)N . (6)
Notice that the left hand side of equation (6) is the expected number of buyers who visit seller i and are
served, while the right hand side is the expected number of sales. Therefore, the probability of being
served by seller i is given by:
Λi (p) =
1−  1−θi (p)N
Nθi (p)
,
which is the probability that at least one buyer selects seller i ,
 
1− (1−θi (p)N , divided by the expected
number of buyers visiting seller i Nθi (p).
Suppose that all sellers have the same advertising level a , and that one seller deviates setting a price
pˆ when all other sellers set price p . From (4) it has to be the case that θˆ+(M−1)θ = 1, where θˆ represents
the probability of buyers selecting the deviating seller. Thus, the probability with which a buyer selects a
non-deviating sellers is:
θ =
1− θˆ
(M −1) .
7
As a result, the expected utility from selecting a non deviating seller is given by:
U (pˆ , p−1) = (1−p )

1−1− 1−θˆ(M−1)N
N

1−θˆ
M−1
 , (7)
while the expected utility from selecting the deviating seller is given by:
Uˆ (pˆ , p−1) = (1− pˆ )

1− (1− θˆ )N 
N θˆ
. (8)
Equating (7) and (8) yield an implicit solution for θˆ which is given by:
(1−p )
(1− pˆ ) =
(1− θˆ )1− (1− θˆ )N 
(M −1)θˆ

1−1− ( 1−θˆM−1 )N ≡Ψ(θˆ ). (9)
Fortunately, the explicit solution is not needed to derive the equilibrium.10 All we need are the con-
ditions under which there exists a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium selection between selecting a de-
viating and a non deviating seller.
Equation (9) describes the price wedge between a deviating and a non-deviating seller. It is easy to
check that this price wedge, Ψ(θˆ ), is strictly decreasing in θˆ and has the following properties:
lim
θˆ→0
Ψ(θˆ ) =
N /(M −1)
1−1− 1M−1N ≥ 1,
lim
θˆ→1
Ψ(θˆ ) =
1
N
.
It is possible to have Ψ(1)<(1− p )/(1− pˆ )<Ψ(0). Thus, for an appropriate (1− p )/(1− pˆ ), there is a
unique θˆ = θˆ (pˆ , p ) ∈ (0, 1) that makes buyers indifferent between sellers posting p and pˆ .11 The equilib-
rium selection strategy is then given by:
θˆ =

0 if (1−p )(1−pˆ ) >Ψ(0),
1 if (1−p )(1−pˆ ) <Ψ(1),
θˆ (pˆ , p ) otherwise.
(10)
10This property of equilibrium θˆ is particular to the use of a posted price mechanism. When using auctions or ex post bidding,
these probabilities have closed form solutions, see Julien, Kennes, and King (2000,2005) for more details.
11See Burdett, Shi and Wright(2001) for a similar demonstration of this condition.
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When all sellers set the same price and signal, the unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for
buyers is θˆ = θ ∗ = θ = 1M . Using the selection strategy defined by (10), when all buyers select a particular
seller i with the same (but arbitrary) probability θi , the probability that at least one buyer selects seller i
is given by:
qi (p) = 1− 1−θi (p)N .
2.2 Equilibrium Prices and Advertising
In this section we analyze the equilibrium properties of this economy with uncoordinated buyers, ca-
pacity constrained sellers and probabilistic signals.
Definition An equilibrium for this environment is:
1. A vector of prices and signals (p; a) = (p1, ..., pM ; a 1, ..., a M ) maximizing sellers’ expected profits as
best response to each other, and taking as given the buyers’ mixed strategies.
2. Symmetric mixed strategies for each buyer θi , i = 1, ..., M , maximizing expected utility taking as
given (p , a ).
3. The best responses of buyers and sellers are consistent with each other.
Assume that all sellers but one set a price p and signal a , while a deviating seller sets price pˆ and
signal ba . The objective of a deviating seller is given by:
max
aˆ ,pˆ
¦
γ(Aˆ) pˆ bq (pˆ , p−1)− c (ba )− F© , (11)
where q
 
pˆ , p−1

= 1− (1− θˆ )N is the probability of sale for the deviating seller. To simplify notation we
define θˆ = θ
 
pˆ , p−1

. The profit maximizing deviation satisfies the following first-order conditions:
γ′(Aˆ) pˆ

1− (1− θˆ )N − c ′(ba ) = 0, (12)
γ(Aˆ)
h
1− (1− θˆ )N + pˆ N (1− θˆ )N−1 ∂ θˆ
∂ pˆ
i
= 0. (13)
9
where γ(Aˆ) = 1− e− AˆN .
Assuming that θˆ ∈ (0, 1), differentiating (9) with respect to pˆ and imposing the symmetric equilibrium
conditions pˆ = p , ba = a for all sellers, and θˆ = θ = 1/M for all buyers, we obtain the price change effect
on buyers selection probability which is given by:
∂ θˆ
∂ pˆ
=
1
(1− pˆ )Ψ′ (θˆ ) , (14)
or
∂ θˆ
∂ pˆ
=
− (M −1)2 h1−M−1M Ni
M 2
 
1−phM −1−M−1M N (M +N −1)i < 0, (15)
which implies that a higher price leads to lower probability for a seller to be selected.
From equation (12), the individual equilibrium advertisement is given by:
A∗(M , N ) =N ln
1− NM 1− 1M N−1−1− 1M N
βN
 . (16)
Substituting (15) into (13), yields the following equilibrium price:
p ∗(M , N ) =
M −M M+N−1M−1 M−1M N
M −M 2−M+NM−1 M−1M N , (17)
with pM < 0 and pN > 0 representing the partial derivatives with respect to M and N respectively.
Let φ = N /M represent the market tightness (the buyers to sellers ratio). In large markets, we fix
M = M¯ and assume M¯ and N are large enough so that (1− 1M )N ≈ eφ , the equilibrium advertising and
price can be approximated by:12
A∗  φ= M¯φ ln1− e−φ −φe−φ
βM¯φ

, (18)
p ∗  φ= 1− φ
eφ −1 . (19)
Proposition 1 In arbitrarily large (but finite) market with small marginal advertising cost β , an advertis-
12The limit price is the same as in Burdett, Shi and Wright(2001) and advertising does not affect the equilibrium price for a
given market tightness.
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ing equilibrium exists, i.e., there exists a pair (φ¯,φ) with 0<φ < φ¯ <∞ such that A∗(φ) = A∗(φ) = 0, and
∀φ ∈ (φ,φ), A∗(φ)> 0. Moreover, the industry advertising level is inverted U-shape in the market tightness
φ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that if advertising is costless, that isβ = 0, then a ∗(φ)→∞with γ(A)→ 1 and this is the standard
directed search model with price posting (see Burdett, Shi and Wright(2001)). Otherwise, for competitive
markets, smallφ, an increase in market structure yields a higher probability to face only one or no buyer
by a seller relative to the probability to face many. But the probability to make a sale is driven by the
probability to face at least one buyer. As φ increases, it is worthwhile for a seller to increase advertising
to maximize expected profits. For large φ, an increase in market structure yields a lower probability
of facing only one relative to the probability of facing several buyers, there is eventually less need for
advertising and advertising intensity decreases inφ.
When competition is less severe, larger φ, the probability to not make a sale as the number of seller
decreases becomes important. This is the case because there are already a relatively small number of
sellers. Since the decrease in probability of not making a sale becomes less important, and the prob-
ability to be visited by several buyers is higher, there is less need for each seller to advertise and lower
advertising is observed. Thus, there is a trade-off between the incentives to increase advertising driven
by equilibrium price increase, and the incentive to advertise less since there are less sellers and the prob-
ability of no sale decreases. For low φ, the price effect is more important. Sellers have an incentive to
advertise more to compensate the marginal reduction in probability of no sale; advertising increases in
market tightness. See Figure 1 for a specific example where the inverted U-shape between advertising
and market tightness is observed.
With a large buyer to seller ratio, an exit by one seller will not have much of an impact on the equi-
librium price. However, when such a ratio is small, an exit by one seller creates a bigger impact on the
equilibrium price. This effect is consistent with standard models yielding a continuous relationship be-
tween market structure and price/quantity such as the Cournot model.
As the market becomes more competitive (φ → 0), the equilibrium price converges to zero. The
model’s predictions converge to a perfectly competitive outcome with equilibrium price equals marginal
cost of production which is zero in the model. On the other hand, as the market becomes a monopoly
11
(φ→∞), the price tends to 1. Since advertising is essential for prices to be known by buyers and for the
market to exist, for all φ /∈ (φ,φ), we find a ∗(φ) = p ∗  φ = 0. Furthermore, since φ is increasing in β ,
for small enough β it can be shown that p ∗(φ) is very close to 1, however, generally we find, p ∗

φ

> 0.
This suggest, naturally, that a minimal price required for the market to exist. The large market result is
also valid in finite markets.
Lemma 1 Given β¯ > 0 such that ∀ 0<β < β¯ and any M¯<∞, there exists a pair 0 <N < N¯ <∞ such that
a ∗(M¯ , N ) = a ∗(M¯ , N¯ ) = 0, and ∀N ∈ (N , N¯ ), a ∗(M¯ , N )> 0 with a ∗(M¯ , N ) being inverted U-shape in N .
Proof. See the Appendix.
3 Alternative Advertising Technology
In the previous section we assumed that γ(A) to be the probability that all buyers know all prices. Now we
assume a more general advertising technology which we denote byδ(A)which represents the probability
that one buyer observes all prices. As a consequence, the probabilities of being informed across buyers
are independent, thus we must consider N +1 possible events. These are given by:13
0. No buyer is informed, thus the market does not exist. This event occurs with probability C 0N [1−
δ(A)]N ;
1. Only one buyer is informed of all prices, while the rest of buyers are not. The probability of this
event is given by C 1Nδ(A)[1−δ(A)]N−1;
2. Only two buyers are informed of all prices, while the other buyers do not know any prices. This
event occurs with probability C 2Nδ(A)
2[1−δ(A)]N−2;
N. All buyers are informed of all prices. The probability of such event is given by C NN [δ(A)]
N .
Note that what seller i is concerned about is the probability that at least one other buyer shows up at
her store. The complementary event that no buyer shows up at seller i is given by:
Pr(n i = 0) =C 0N [1−δ(A)]N +C 1Nδ(A)[1−δ(A)]N−1[1−θi (p, a)]+
C 2Nδ(A)
2[1−δ(A)]N−2[1−θi (p, a)]2+ · · · · · ·+C NN [δ(A)]N [1−θi (p, a)]N
13C 0N denotes the combinatorial operation corresponding to N buyers and 0 zero been informed.
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where the buyers’ strategy is given by:
θ (p, a) = {θ1(p, a), · · · ,θi (p, a), · · · ,θM (p, a)}.
By the Binomial theorem we can rewrite the complementary probability that no buyer shows up at
seller i as follows:
Pr(n i = 0) =

(1−δ(A))+δ(A)[1−θi (p, a)]	N = 1−δ(A)θi (p, a)	N .
Thus the probability that seller i gets at least one buyer is 1−1−δ(A)θi (p, a)N . Then the seller i ’s profit
maximization problem can then be written as follows:
max
a i ,p i
Π(p, a) =
¦
1− 1−δ(A)θi (p, a)N©p i −C (a i )− F. (20)
As in the previous section, if a particular buyer is informed, her probability of getting served by seller
i , Λi , must satisfy the following local market clearing condition:
Nδ(A)θi (p, a)Λi = 1− 1−δ(A)θi (p, a)N . (21)
Notice that the left hand side of equation (20) is the expected number of buyers who visit seller i and
are served, while the right hand side is the expected number of sales. Therefore, the probability of being
served by seller i is given by:
Λi =
1− 1−δ(A)θi (p, a)N
Nδ(A)θi (p, a)
.
Since we focus on symmetric equilibrium, we take seller i as the deviator by letting her choose (aˆ , pˆ ),
while the rest of sellers follow the symmetric strategy denoted by (a , p ). Correspondingly, we denote θˆ as
the probability by which buyers choose seller i , and θ as the probability of buyers choosing other sellers.
Given the probability of being served, the expected utility of a buyer from selecting seller i is then
given by:
Uˆ (p, a) = (1− pˆ )Λˆ = (1− pˆ )1−

1−δ(A)θˆ (p, a)N
Nδ(A)θˆ (p, a)
, (22)
13
while the expected utility of selecting a seller other than seller i can be written as follows:
U (p, a) = (1−p )1−
h
1−δ(A) 1−θˆ (p,a)M−1
iN
Nδ(A) 1−θˆ (p,a)M−1
, (23)
where we have imposed the fact that 1− θˆ = (M −1)θ .
The mixed strategy used by buyers requires that Uˆ (p, a) =U (p, a), the buyer’s indifference condition,
which is equivalent to:
1−p
1−p i =
(1− θˆ )1− [1−δ(A)θˆ ]N
(M −1)θˆ {1−h1−δ(A) 1−θˆM−1iN } . (24)
If we now consider seller i ’s problem, the first-order conditions corresponding to her profit maxi-
mization problem are as follows:
1− 1−δ(A)θˆN +N pˆδ(A)1−δ(A)θˆN−1 ∂ θˆ
∂ pˆ
= 0, (w.r.t pˆ )
N pˆ

1−δ(A)θˆN−1dδ(A)
d aˆ
θˆ +
∂ θˆ
∂ aˆ
δ(A)

−C ′(aˆ ) = 0. (w.r.t aˆ )
In order to determine ∂ θˆ
∂ pˆ and
∂ θˆ
∂ aˆ , we need to totally differentiate equation (23) with respect to aˆ while
setting aˆ = a , pˆ = p and θˆ = 1M . We then have that:¨
1−

1− δ(A)
M
N
−N δ(A)
M

1− δ(A)
M
N−1« ∂ θ
∂ a
= 0, (25)
which implicitly assumes that sellers are able to see the aggregate advertising level as well as the individ-
ual one.
In a symmetric equilibrium, equation (24) implies either the term in the braces equals zero or ∂ θ
∂ a
equals zero. Notice that from the point view of the seller, the term in the braces is the probability that at
least two buyers show up to her store.
Similarly, by totally differentiating (23) with respect to pˆ and imposing aˆ = a , pˆ = p and θˆ = 1M , we
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have that in the equilibrium the mixed strategy must satisfy:
∂ θ
∂ p
=
(M −1)h1− (1− δ(A)M )Ni
M (1−p )nNδ(A)(1− δ(A)M )N−1−M h1− (1− δ(A)M )Nio . (26)
Given these conditions, if we substitute ∂ θ
∂ p into the first-order condition with respect to pˆ , we have
that the equilibrium price is given by:
p =

1−1− δ(A)M N§Nδ(A)1− δ(A)M N−1−M [1−1− δ(A)M N ]ª
Nδ(A)

1− δ(A)M
N−1
1−1− δ(A)M N−M 21−1− δ(A)M N2 . (27)
To determine the large market counterpart, let φ = NM and we fix M = M¯ and assume M¯ and N are
large enough so that (1− 1M )N ≈ eφ . Then the equilibrium price p for large markets is as follows:
p → 1− e−φδ(A)−φδ(A)e−φδ(A)
1− e−φδ(A) .
The equilibrium price is similar to the previous section, now because of the different advertising tech-
nology, it depends on the expected market tightness, φδ(A). It is easy to observe that if δ(A) = 1,
the two equilibrium prices are equivalent. Notice that for a large market, the price tends to zero if
1 − e−φδ(A) −φδ(A)e−φδ(A) = 0. Note that the term in the braces of equation (25), converges to 1 −
e−φδ(A) −φδ(A)e−φδ(A) as the market becomes large. Therefore this leads to an equilibrium where the
market shuts down. This is the case because if sellers price at p = 0, then they have no incentive to invest
in costly advertising, i.e., δ(A) = 0. However, this is consistent with 1− e−φδ(A)−φδ(A)e−φδ(A) = 0. If a
seller deviates and spends a > 0, she would not be able to price at p > 0 since buyers will have a positive
probability to learn that other sellers are charging a zero price.
Proposition 2 There exist two types of equilibria in the model with general advertising technology, when
the probabilities of being informed across different consumers are independent:
(i) There always exists a non-advertising equilibrium such that A∗ = 0 and p ∗ = 0. Thus the market
collapses.
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(ii) There always exists an advertising equilibrium such that dθd a |A=A∗ = 0 with p ∗ > 0. Furthermore, the
aggregate advertising level is inverted U-shape in market tightness for any concave enough advertis-
ing technology.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that the inverted U-shape pattern of advertising and market tightness is an equi-
librium outcome of a matching environment with capacity constrained sellers, uncoordinated buyers
while sellers face a general costly informative advertisement technology.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides a formal framework to explore the incentives of sending signals from sellers to buy-
ers changes as different market structures and advertising technologies are considered. The environ-
ment under study has sellers that are capacity constrained and buyers are uncoordinated when selecting
a particular seller. When sellers send signals only a fraction of buyers observe all prices. Thus returns on
advertising are probabilistic. This modeling strategy allows a more detailed analysis of the relationship
between advertising and market prices.
The costly directed search environment presented in this paper alleviates the discontinuity problem
of pure price equilibrium strategies when prices are equal that is typically observed in the literature. Here
we are able to characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium price and advertisement.
Finally, we find that the relationship between market concentration and advertising is unimodal (in-
verted U-shape) while being robust to different advertising technologies. For relatively low concentra-
tion industries, increases in market price due to higher concentration create a positive association be-
tween advertising and the market price. This yields more advertisements per seller, and more informa-
tive signals in the industry. On the other hand, for relatively high concentration industries, an increase
in concentration leads to a negative association. These predictions are consistent with the empirical
literature as documented in Bagwell(2007).
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix M = M¯ , we have A∗ = M¯φ ln 1−eφ−φeφ
M¯φβ
. Notice the fraction in the logarithm
function tends to 0 as φ goes to 0. It is easy to see that 1−eφ−φeφ
M¯φβ
is hump shape. If β is small enough
so that M¯β is not too large and κ=1 where κ= 1−e−φ−φe−φ
βM¯φ
, then we have that A∗(φ) = A∗(φ) = 0, and
∀φ ∈ (φ,φ), A∗(φ)> 0.
Let us now differentiate A∗  φ= M¯φ ln 1−e−φ−φe−φ
βM¯φ

w.r.tφ, so that:
d A
dφ
= M¯

ln

1− e−φ −φe−φ
βM¯φ

+
φ2e−φ + e−φ +φe−φ −1
1− e−φ −φe−φ

.
We know that the first part in the fraction is positive between φ and φ¯ but eventually goes to −∞.
The second part can be re-written as φ
2e−φ
1−e−φ−φe−φ − 1 where φ
2e−φ
1−e−φ−φe−φ decreases from +∞ to 0. Thus
φ2e−φ
1−e−φ−φe−φ − 1 has positive positive values when φ is small and decreases eventually negative values as
φ increases. In sum, there exist a unique maximizer φ ∈ [φ,φ] for a ∗(φ), and this function must be
inverted U-shape.
Proof of Lemma 1. Follows from Proposition 1 using (15) and for any finite N , set φ = N /M¯ and
φ = N¯ /M¯ .
Proof of Proposition 2. The first part in proposition 2 is immediate following from the previous expla-
nation. Hereafter we prove the second part.
Existence. Notice that
F (δ, A) =
dδ(A)
d A
=
dδ(A)
d a
=
β (1− e−φδ(A))
φδ(A)e−φδ(A)[1− e−φδ(A))−φδ(A)e−φδ(A))] . (28)
is an ordinary differential equation. We can set the initial condition as δ(Amin) = δˆ with Amin > 0 suffi-
ciently close to 0. It is easily to show that F (δ, A) is decreasing in both arguments. Therefore F (δ, A) is
bounded by F (δˆ, Amin) when Amin≤A≤+∞ and δˆ≤δ≤1. Clearly, F (δ, A) is continuous in all its region.
By applying standard sufficient condition of existence, the solution to dδAd A = F (δ, A) always exists when
A≥Amin.
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Inverted U-shape. Taking logarithms on both sides of equation (27), we have that
ln(δ′(A)) = ln(β )+ ln(1− e−φδ(A))− ln(φ)− ln(δ(A))+φδ(A)− ln(1− e−φδ(A)−φδ(A)e−φδ(A)). (29)
Totally differentiating the previous expression, we have that the aggregate advertising has the following
property with respect to market tightness:
d A
dφ
=
δ(A)2
φδ′(A)
τt
τb
; (30)
where
τt = 1+
e−φδ(A)
1− e−φδ(A) −
1
φδ(A)
− φδ(A)e−φδ(A)
1− e−φδ(a )−φδ(A)e−φδ(a ) ,
τb =
δ′′(A)
δ(A)2
− φe−φδ(A)
1− e−φδ(A) +
1
δ(A)
−φ+ φ2δ(A)e−φδ(A)
1− e−φδ(a )−φδ(A)e−φδ(a ) .
By rearranging, we have
d A
dφ
=
δ(A)2
φδ′(A)
τ′t
τ′b
; (31)
where
τ′t =

1− e−φδ(A)φδ(A)+ e−φδ(A)−φ2δ2e−φδ(A)−1
−φδ(A)e−φδ(A) φδ(A)+ e−φδ(A)−1
τ′b =

δ′′(A)+δ(A)1− e−φδ(A)1− e−φδ(A)−φδ(A)e−φδ(A)
−φ2δ(A)3e−φδ(A)1− e−φδ(A)−2φδ(A)e−φδ(A)+φδ(A)e−2φδ(A)
Let’s simply assume that the concave advertising technology has constant second derivative with δ′′ =
k < 0 small enough. It’s easy to see τ′b is always strictly negative when φ > 0 and δ′′ is negative enough.
This is because the second term in τ′b

φ2δ(A)3e−φδ(A)

1− e−φδ(A)−2φδ(A)e−φδ(A)+φδ(A)e−2φδ(A)
is bounded away around −0.1 from below and eventually goes to +∞.. In fact, the first derivative of
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
1− e−φδ(A)−2φδ(A)e−φδ(A)+φδ(A)e−2φδ(A) is
δ2

1− e−φδ(A)−φδ(A)e−φδ(A)+2φδ(e−φδ− e−2φδ)(φδ−1)
which can be negative only if φδ < 1. This condition implies that the absolute value of the second part
in τ′b is very small when it is negative. Thus, given that the first part in τ′b is negative enough when δ is
concave enough, τ′b is always negative.
Notice thatφδ(A)+e−φδ(A)−φ2δ2e−φδ(A)−1 equals δ(A)−1< 0 whenφ = 0 and goes from negative
values to positive values. However,φδ(A)+e−φδ(A)−1 is always positive whenφ > 0. Thus, τ′t is negative
whenφ is small. It goes to +∞whenφ gets large, which can be seen easily by re-writing τ′t as

1− e−φδ(A)−φδ(A)e−φδ(A)φδ(A)+ e−φδ(A)−1−φ2δ(A)2e−φδ(A) 1− e−φδ(A) .
In sum, the first derivative of A w.r.t φ changes from positive values to negative ones. Therefore, the
industry advertising level A must be inverted U-shape.
Figure 2 shows the property of d Adφ . The blue section of the three dimensional graph represents the
values of (δ,φ)when d Adφ ≤ 0. Clearly, for high values of δ(A), d Adφ peaks at low values of φ, and vice versa
for low values of δ(A). It also shows that, for φ close to zero, d Adφ tends to infinity, a property similar to
Inada condition.
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Figure 1: Advertising intensity for β = 0.0001,M = 500.
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Figure 2: d Adφ with general advertising technology.
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